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Haggerty and Shanteau: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT: THE
NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES A HARD LOOK AT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Washington Trollers Association v. Kreps,1 the Ninth
Circuit held that the summary of information utilized by the Pacific Fishery Management Council (the Council) in arriving at
the Fishery Management Plan's specifications must be sufficient
to enable an interested party to intelligently comment on those
specifications.I
On May 13, 1977, the plaintiff, Washington Trollers Association, challenged regulations implementing the 1977 Pacific
Salmon Fishery Management Plan.' Plaintiff requested either a
preliminary injunction or summary judgment, arguing that the
regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce were invalid.
The district court denied the action.· In June 1977, the Ninth
Circuit denied a motion to stay the application of the regulations, and the 1977 Plan went into effect.' Plaintiff then filed the
current motion for summary judgement following a second
amended complaint challenging the 1978 Pacific Fishery Management Plan (the Plan).' Plaintiff contended that the Plan did
not conform to the requirements of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976 (the Act)? in that it failed to adequately describe the methodology used to arrive at the Plan pro1. 645 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Karlton, D.J., sitting by designation, and Poole, J., diBBenting).
2. Id. at 686.
3. Washington Trollers Ass'n v. Kreps, 466 F. Supp. 309, 311 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976). Section 1853(a)(3) of the Act provides that fishery
management plans must "assess and specify the present and probable future condition
of, and the maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield from, the fishery, and include
a summary of the information utilized in making such specification." Id. § 1853(a)(3).
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jections and recommendations. Plaintiff claimed that this failure
prevented informed criticism' and, therefore, should invalidate
the regulations promulgated to implement the Plan." The defendant Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) sought to establish
the validity of the regulations.
The district court determined that the type and amount of
information required by the Act had been phrased in such vague
and open-ended terms that it would always be possible to find
some omission in the information supplied by the Secretary.lo
The court then required the defendant to make a good faith effort to supply available information regarding the choice of management options. l l As long as such an effort appeared to have
been made, the court would uphold the Secretary's findings. I I
The district court reasoned that because the plaintiff failed to
point to any information which the Secretary withheld or to any
significant subject which the Secretary had ignored, the Plan
was valid. 11
On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's entry of
summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that there was a material
dispute regarding the availability of the information used in the
Council's Plan, and that the Plan did not conform to the provisions of the Act. lf The Council relied upon computerized analysis systems and had described neither the methodology nor the
data used to arrive at projections and recommendations of the
Plan. 11 Plaintiff contended that without such a description, the
information was not readily available and therefore precluded
interested parties from meaningful comment. I I The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's standard of good faith effort,
8. One purpose of the Act is to "enable. . . interested persons to participate in and
advise on the establishment and administration of such (fishery] plans . . . ." ld. §
180l(b)(5)(A).
9. The Secretary must find the Plan to be consistent with national standards and
other applicable provisions of law. rd. §§ 1854(a).1854(b), 1855(c). Thus, the existence of
a plan conforming to the statutory prerequisites is a condition to the Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations. Washington Trollers Ass'n v. KrepI, 466 F. Supp. at 312.
10. 466 F. Supp. at 313.
11.ld.
12.ld.
13. ld. at 314.
14. 645 F.2d at 685. See note 7 8upro for pertinent text of the statute.
15. 645 F.2d at 685.
16.ld.
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reversed the entry of summary judgment, and ordered further
proceedings to resolve the factual dispute.It
B.

BACKGROUND

Implementing the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Congress declared that the purpose of the Act was to take
immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources
oft'the coasts of the United States,1. taking into account the best
scientific information available,18 while being "responsive to the
needs of interested and affected states and citizens.'tao To do so,
the Act created eight Regional Fishery Management Councils.·1
Each council is charged with the development of that region's
Fishery Management Plan.·· The objective of the Plan is to prevent over-fis~g, yet achieve the optimum yield" of each
fishery.··
Once this plan has been developed, it must be made availa17. ld. at 686.
18. The preamble of the Act provides: "It is therefore declared to be the purposes of
the Congreai in this chapter-(1) to take immediate action to conaerve and manage the
fishery resources found oft'the couts of the United States .•.." 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)
(1976).
19. ld. § 1801(c)(3) provides: "It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress
in this chapter- .•. (3) to assure that the national fishery conservation and management program utilizes, and is bued upon, the best scientific information available

"
20.ld.
21. ld. § 1852(a) provides: "There shall be established •.. eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils . . . . Each Council shall reflect the expertise and interest of the
several conatituent States in the ocean area over which such Council is granted
authority."
22. "Each Council shall ... (1) prepare and submit to the Secretary a fishery management plan with respect to each fishery within ita geographical area of authority
...." ld. § 1852(h)(1).
23. Optimum yield u used in the Act means:
[T)he amount of fish(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
Nation, with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
(B) which is prescribed u such on the buis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, u modified by any
relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.
ld. § 1802(18).
24. Fishery is defined u "(A) one or more stocks of fish which can be treated u a
unit for the purposes of conservation and management and which are identified on the
buis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational, and economic characteristics; and
(B) any fishing for such stocks." ld. § 1802(7).
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ble for public comment.:I& One of the stated policies of the Act is
that it shall take into account the social and economic needs of
the region it serves by allowing interested parties to comment on
and participate in the establishment of these plans.16 The Council is to conduct public hearings to facilitate such comment17
and, as part of the required contents of the Plan, include a summary of the information used in specifying optimum yields."
The Secretary then receives the Plan and notifies the Council of
her approval or disapproval.III If approved, the Secretary
promulgates such regulations as needed to implement the
Plan. 80 These regulations must conform to the national standards as set forth in the Act,1l and are subject to judicial review
as authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act.1I
25. "Each Council shall ... (3) conduct public hearings ... so as to allow all interested persons an opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management
plans ...." Id. § 1852(h)(3).
26. The preamble of the Act states:
It is therefore declared to be the purposes of the Congress
in this chapter(5) to establish Regional Fishery Management Councils to
prepare, monitor, and revise such plans under circumstances
(A) which will enable the States, the fishing Industry, consumer and environmental organizationa, and other interested
persons to participate in, and advise on, the establishment and
administration of such plans and (B) which take into account
the social and economic needs of the States . . . •
Id. § 1801(b)(5).
27. Id. § 1852(h)(3). For the text of the statute, see note 25 ,upra.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3) (1976). For the text of § 1853(a)(3), see note 7 supra..
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1976).
30. Id. § 1855(a).
31. The Secretary is charged with reviewing "any fishery management plan, and any
amendment to any such plan, prepared by any Council and submitted to him to determine whether it is consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this
chapter, and any other applicable law." Id. § 1854(b).
32. "Regulations promulgated by the Secretary . . . shall be subject to judicial review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of title 5; ... except
that. .. (2) the appropriate court shall only set aside any such regulation on a ground
specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of such title." Id. § 1855(d).
The Administrative Procedure Act provides:
To the extent necessary to decision . . . , the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be-
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The Hard Look Doctrine
While decisions regarding any fishery management regulation are subject to the review outlined by the Administrative
Procedure Act, that standard of review has recently been interpreted to allow a degree of scrutiny enabling the courts to
closely examme agency decisions.as The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act" has given
way to a "hard look" doctrine which does not presume the validity of an agency decision." Judge Leventhal attempted to delineate this new rule of interpretation in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC," by suggesting that whenever a court senses
"danger signals" which may indicate an agency has neglected to
take a " 'hard look' at the salient problems"" affecting its decision making, the court may scrutinize the evidence to "penetrate
the underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the
agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do
not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.""
The trend facilitating review of agency decisions was furthered in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckleshaus.'t The
court there stated that an agency must make available to all interested parties data on which it bases it regulations to insure
that the agency has fulfilled its "continuing duty to take a hard
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordanC!l with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privi.
lege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by
law;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976).
33. Warner, Finamore & Bean, Practical Application of the Conservation Aspects
of the Fishery Conservation and ManaBement Act, 5 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REv. 30, 65
(1981).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). See note 32 supra for text of the pertinent section. See
Benerally S. BEYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 289
(1979).
35. Warner, Finamore & Bean, supra note 33, at 65.
36. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cu. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
37. ld. at 851.
38. ld. at 850. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 385 F.2d
678 (D.C. Cir. 1967».
39. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cu. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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look at the problems involved in its regulatory task."40 The
Portland Cement court held that the purpose of an agency is not
to promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or data
known only to the agency.41 United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Products, which cited Portland Cement with approval, established a standard for disclosure of information when the proposed rule is based on a scientific determination." The Nova
Scotia court reasoned that unless the agency discloses the scientific data it relies upon in its determination, criticism of the
methodology is meaningless, and the nondisclosure effectively
eliminates meaningful comment.4I
C.

COURT'S REASONING

The Majority

The majority focused on the overall policies of Congress as
announced in the Act. U Quoting from the Act, the court stated
that one objective is to "enable the States, the fishing industry,
consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested
persons to participate in, and advise on, the establishment and
administration of such [fishery] plans ... !'411
The court then determined that to effectuate this goal, interested parties must be informed in order to make meaningful
comments.411 The Ninth Circuit relied upon Portland Cemenf4'
40. Id. at 394.
41. Id. at 393. Plaintiff (Portland Cement Association) repudiated defendant's (Environmental Protection Agency) test data, upon which defendant's regulations were
based. Defendant did not respond, but promulgated the regulations unchanged, exactly
as they were before plaintiff's comment. The court held: "It is not consonant with the
purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate rules on the baais of inadequate data
or on data that [to a) critical degree, is known only to the agency." Id.
42. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). Defendants argued that unlet18 the Food and Drug
Administration specified the scientific data relied upon in making Its regulations, a criticism of the methodology would be useleSB. The court held that "(wlhen the basis for a
proposed rule is a scientific decision, the scientific material [supporting) the rule should
be exposed to the view of interested parties for their comment. . . . To suppreSB meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is akin to rejecting comment altogether." Id. at 252.
43.Id.
44. 645 F.2d at 686.
45. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5)(A)(1976».
46. 645 F.2d at 686.
47. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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and Nova Scotia Food Products 48 for the proposition that an administrative agency cannot base its regulatory decisions upon
material known only to the agency itself.
Because any comment regarding the Council's determination of maximum sustainable yield or optimum yield would be
based upon a summary of information the Council used,"8 the
Ninth Circuit found that the summary must meet at least some
minimum standard of reasonable disclosure. It "must therefore
provide information sufficient to enable an interested or affected
party to comment intelligently on those specifications."lIo
Moreover, the court required any information mentioned in
the summary to be reasonably available to an interested party.1I1
The court noted that only information central to the decision,
not all raw data or information, need be supplied.III Such information can simply be incorporated by reference in order to allow
an interested party a means of discerning how the Council made
its determination. III
Since the parties disagreed on what the court believed to be
material issues of fact,1I4 and those issues remained unresolved
by the district court's decision, summary judgment had been improperly granted.1II The court decided that, because there was no
way to determine whether means for meaningful comment had
been available, further proceedings to resolve the factual disputes were in order. M
48. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. Under § 1853(a)(3) of the Act, every fishery management plan must include a
summary which lists present and probable future conditions, and optimum and maximum sustainable yields. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3)(1976). Without this summary, therefore,
an interested party has no basis for comment on th08e specifications.
50. 645 F.2d at 686.

51.1d.
52. Id. at 686 n.2.
53. Id. at 686.
54. Id. at 686-87. There remained disagreement on how available a description of
the computer methodology actually wes, if the data used was set forth in the Plan, and
how many computer models were actually used to formulate the Plan.
55. Id. at 687. FED. R.CIV. P. 56(c) states in pertinent part that "summary judgment shall be proper only . . . when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."
56. 645 F.2d at 687.
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The Dissent

Judge Poole, dissenting, argued that the Secretary had complied with the statutorily required summary.1I7 He agreed with
the majority's basic premise, that when the Secretary is required
to disclose information, the public should be provided a reasonable means of access. III He disagreed, however, with the majority's
interpretation of the term "summary" as used in the Act. llt The
dissent maintained it was not up to the court to mandate absolute access to all raw data used to arrive at fishery yield
specifications. eo
The dissent found that Congress has "drawn a line of required access," and the court lacked the power to relocate that
line. 61 The dissent also looked to the intent of Congress, and .
found that some limitations had been placed on the disclosure
required of the Secretary;e. all the information essential to the
Plan's formulation need not be available publicly. Judge Poole
argued that Congress anticipated that meaningful comment
could be facilitated without all of the raw data used in making
the Plan's determinations.ell He stated it was not up to the court
to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature."
The dissent relied on recent Ninth Circuit decisions which
57.1d.
58. 1d.
59. 1d.
60. 1d.
61. 1d.
62. 1d.

at
at
at
at
at

688.
687-88.
688-89.
688.
689. Section 1853(d) of the Act states in pertinent part:
Any statistics submitted to the Secretary by any person in
compliance with any requirement under subsection (a)(5) of
this section shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed eltcept when required under court order . . . eltcept that . . .
such statistics [may be disclosed] in any aggregate or summary
form which does not directly or indirectly disclose the identity
or business of any person who submits such statistics.
16 U.S.C. § 1853(d) (1976). The Senate Conference Report also states (referring to §
1853): "This section also requires that statistics ... not be released to the public in the
form of individual records ...." S. CONF. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53
(1976).
This section seems designed to protect the identity of the persons or businesses submitting the statistics, not to prevent the release of the information itself. However, this
is not noted by the dissent.
63. 645 F.2d at 689.
64.1d.
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decided similar issues. In Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. Schlesinger,811 the court declined to grant complete
access to all raw data used in compiling an environmental impact statement (EIS), requiring only that a reasonable method
of access to the information be provided.88 In National Wildlife
Federation v. Adams,'" the Ninth Circuit outlined a standard
which must be met in order to set aside regulations for inadequate disclosure. 88 The court held that disclosures must be set
aside when they are so grossly deficient that they frustrate the
public's right to comment.8 ' Here, the dissent argued that because the disclsoure was not so grossly deficient, the regulations
were valid.'70
Judge Poole further stated that the facts upon which the
majority reversed summary judgment were not relevant if the
inquiry was one of whether the Secretary complied with the
statutorily mandated summary.'71 He noted that the required
amount of information was reasonably available, as notice was
given specifying who to contact for further information," and
stated that plaintiff's failure to pursue this available avenue
foreclosed opportunity for complaint. 'fa The dissent argued that
the disclosure in this particular case was well within the legislative mandate.'74
65. 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981).

66. ld. at 595.
67. 629 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1980).
68. ld. at 593.
69. ld. In National Wildlife, plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of a federally·
approved highway on the grounds that the draft EIS was deficient and that circulating
such an inadequate statement frustrated the public right to comment. The court stated
that the question of compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental
Protection Act is a procedural one, governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.s.C. § 706(2)(D). See note 32 supra for text of § 706(2)(D). The court found that the
effects described in the draft EIS complied with the statute and held only that when the
disclosure is 80 grossly deficient as to frustrate the opportunity to comment will the reg·
ulation be set aside. 629 F.2d at 593.
70. 645 F.2d at 691.
71. ld. at 690.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (1976) provides: "As soon as practicable ... the Secretary
shall publish in the Federal Register (A) such plan ...• and (B) any regulations which
he proposes to promulgate to implement such plan or amendment." Notice of this partie·
ular plan had been published at 43 Fed. Reg. 15,630 (1978).
73. 645 F.2d at 690.
74.1d.
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CRITIQUE

Since the hard look doctrine was first enunciated in Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,7I courts have more closely examined agency decisions involving interests which rest upon scientific judgments.'6 The lack of sufficient scientific data on record may operate as one of the danger signals indicating that the
agency has failed to adequately examine the data upon which it
bases its decisions. '7
Both Portland Cement Association v. Ruckleshaus" and
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products" extended the
doctrine by requiring an agency to supply an adequate amount
of information to all interested parties so that they might be
able to scrutinize and comment upon an agency's decisions. The
goal is not simply comment, but meaningful, intelligent comment.so As noted by the Nova Scotia court, failure to disclose.
enough information has the same effect as simply forbidding
comment.SI
The Ninth Circuit adopted this doctrine in Western Oil and
Gas Association v. EPA,SI when it established its standard of
review of administrative agencies. The court there held that
when a substantive judgment is committed to an agency's discretion, available procedural safeguards should be vigorously enforced. sa The Ninth Circuit continued to adhere to the doctrine
in Washington Trollers Association when it advanced an interested party's ability to obtain a hard look at the Secretary's decision by requiring that she provide not only a summary, but a
meaningful summary.
While the majority based its decision on congre88ional intent, the dissent took a narrower view and disagreed with the
majority's construction of the term "summary." The dissent
75. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
76. Warner, Finamore & Bean, supra note 33, at 66.
77. [d. at 69.
78. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
79. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
SO. ld. at 252.
81. [d.
82. 633 F.2d S03 (9th Cir. 19SO).
83. [d. at 813.
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feared that the public had been granted carte blanche, and all
data used in an agency decision will now be available." The dissent relied on Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v.
Schlesinger, sa a case in which the Ninth Circuit declined to
grant complete access to all raw data used in compiling an
agency report. 11 However, in Washington Trollers, the court has
acknowledged the dissent's fear and has clarified its position by
noting that the agency is required to disclose only that information which was central to the Council's decision.I '
The dissent also argued that under National Wildlife Federation v. Adams,11 these regulations were not so grossly deficient that they frustrated the public's right to comment.18 In
that case, however, the Ninth Circuit only outlined what would
not be considered grossly deficient. Perhaps, sub silentio, the
court has now determined what that standard will be: Allowing
comment on a plan without granting access to the data used in
its formulation may qualify as a grossly deficient disclosure.
The dissent seems to have lost sight of two objectives of the
Plan: (1) allowing the public, through comment and advice, to
have a meaningful voice in the shaping of the Plan," and (2)
assuring the use of the best scientific information available in
the Plan. 81 Without public comment, there is no guarantee that
the Plan will respond to the changing economic and social needs
of the communities it is to serve; without access to the information, there is no way to determine that it is truly the best information available.

E.

CONCLUSION

In this decision, the Ninth Circuit has continued the application of the hard look doctrine, maintaining a shift away from
the presumptive validity of the decisions of administrative agen84. 645 F.2d at 688.
85. 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 595.
87. 645 F.2d at 686 n.2.
88. 629 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1980).
89. 645 F.2d at 691.
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(5). 1801(c)(3) (1976). See notes 19 & 26 supra for text of
these sections.
91. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(c)(3). 1851(a)(2) (1976).
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cies. The court allows the public access to information central to
a scientific determination in sufficient degree to enable meaningful comment on that determination. It seems only equitable that
the public be allowed to know how the agency formulates decisions which will affect both the environment and the economy.
While the majority's standard for the sufficiency of information 92 is vague and could perhaps be read to grant too much access, as feared by the dissent, the dissent loses sight of the purpose of the Act because of a semantic difficulty with the
majority's interpetation of the word "summary."
M. Lynn Haggerty

II. NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: PRESSING
STATUTORY DEADLINES INSUFFICIENT TO
CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Western Oil & Gas v. EPA,! the Ninth Circuit held, inter
alia, that pressing statutory deadlines do not provide good cause
for the Environmental Protection Agency to be excused from
complying with the prior notice and comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act and that challenged attainment status designations for California would remain in effect
pending remand to the Agency to permit plaintiffs another opportunity to comment on the regulations. I
92. 645 F.2d at 686.

1. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were
Schroeder, J. and Burns, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. [d. at 812·13. The Ninth Circuit also determined that it had jurisdiction to review
the Agency's promulgation of the California designations. The court ruled that circuits
other than the District of Columbia may hear suits that arise under enumerated sections
of the Act within the regions they serve. And, because California did not promulgate its
designation as nationwide in scope and because the designations constituted a "final ac·
tion," it is reviewable. [d. at 807.
The court declined to decide the collateral estoppel issue argued by the plaintiffs. It
determined that traditionally courts of appeals have permitted federal agencies to reliti·
gate substantially identical legal issues, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948),
and that courts of appeals are not bound by the decisions of other environmental cases,
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
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The Clean Air Act (the Act)8 requires the Agency and state
governments to formUlate air quality standards.· In Western Oil
427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60
(1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
The court also distinguished an earlier decision which appears to contradict the present result. In United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980), the
court held that the Agency was estopped from relitigating certain issues. The Western
Oil court noted that t:le instant case differed because Rayonier arose from slightly different facts. In Rayonier, the Agency filed an enforcement action under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), against a pulp mill. The
FWPCA gave state agencies authority to administer the terms of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (Id. § 1342). The court rejected Rayonier's argument that
there was an "agency relationship" between the Agency and the state "such that the
latter's action in issuing or denying a permit could be deemed the action of the
[Agency)." 627 F.2d at 1003 (citation omitted). The appellate court saw no need to find a
"strict agency relationship" and that the relationship betw~en the Agency and the Washington Department of Ecology was "sufficiently 'close' under the circumstances to preclude relitigation of the issue already resolved in the state court." Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977).
4. The Clean Air Act has a relatively long history in the United States. Due to the
increasing air pollution which accompanied the unprecedented industrial growth during
World War II, Congress enacted its first federal law to reduce air pollution in 1955. Act
of Jul. 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322. Eight years later, Congress enacted the
Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 18571857g (1958», in which Congress gave the federal government a broader role in handling
air pollution problems. The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485,
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571 (1964», gave the Secretary of HEW authority to issue
mandatory air quality criteria and "placed greater emphasis on federal regulatory controls and deempbasized local controls to some extent ..•." F. GRAD, TREATlSB ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 2.03, at 2-53 (1980).
The present air quality regulatory scheme is based on the adoption of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-804, 84 Stat. 1676 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§
1857-18571 (1964», which provide a division of roles between the state and federal governments. These 1970 amendments were in turn substantially amended by the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017642 (Supp. I 1977», "to reftect compromises and occasionally some slight retreats in
instances where the efforts at technology forcing the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
were not fully successful and adjustments of target dates and standards were seen as
useful if not required." F. GRAD, supra, § 2.05, at 294.
The states' duties regarding the formulation of air quality standards are based on 42
U.S.C. § 7407 (Supp. II 1978) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each state shall have primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising
such State by submitting an implementation plan for such
State which will specify the manner in which national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved
and maintained within each air quality control region in Buch
State.
(b) For purposes of developing and carrying out implementation plans under section 7410 of this title(2) the portion of such State which is not part of any·such
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& Gas, plaintiffs alleged that the Environmental Protection

Agency (the Agency) failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure& when the Agency promulgated the list of air quality attainment status designations required by the Act. 1I Plaintiffs argued that after various states submitted their proposed
designations to the Agency, the Agency failed to notify the public in advance to allow it an opportunity to comment on the proposed designations as required by section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (the Procedure Act).' In addition, the Agency
missed its mandated deadlines for publishing proposed attainment status designations (February 3, 1978),' and for publishing
the actual designations and soliciting comments on them (March
3, 1978).9 Plaintiffs filed a timely petition to the Ninth Circuit
challenging the Agency's failure to follow rulemaking procedure,
and submitted comments to the Agency objecting to the
designations. 10
On September 1, 1978, the Agency announced that it would
accept additional public comments. U At that time, plaintiffs
designated region shall be an air quality control region, but
such portion may be subdivided by the State into two or more
air quality control regions . . . .
5. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), defines which federal agencies are subject to review by another agency and defines agency "rulemaking" as
the process for formulating, amending, or repealing any rule made by the agency. Id. §
553. In addition, the Act requires that each applicable agency make all rulemaking available in the Federal Register. Id. § 552(a)(I). The federal district courts have jurisdiction
to enjoin an agency from withholding agency records. Id. § 552(a)(4)(8).
"Agency" is defined as "each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is subject to review by another agency," excluding such authorities as
Congress, the courts of the United States, the military and its courts, the governments of
the District of Columbia and the territories and possessions of the United States. Id. §
551.
The Clean Air Act also indicates that "(tJhe issuance of air quality criteria and information on air pollution control techniques shall be announced in the Federal Register
and copies shall be made available to the general public." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(d) (Supp. II
1978).
6. 633 F.2d at 805. Regions that comply with air quality standard requirements are
called attainment areas. Nonattainment areas are those not complying and include areas
which are unclassifiable due to incomplete information. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)(I),
7502(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
9. 40 C.F.R. §§ 81.300-.356 (1978).
10. 633 F.2d at 806.
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,101 (1978).
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again communicated their objections to the Agency.1I Revised
attainment standards appeared in the Federal Register 011
March 19, 1979.18 Plaintiffs, still dissatisfied, filed a successful
motion for review.14 Contrary to remedies sought by plaintiffs in
other clean air suits in which plaintiffs had asked that the existing designations be declared invalid, 111 in this case, the plaintiffs suggested the entire process of preparing the designations
be repeated strictly in accordance with state and federal procedure, and that the Agency be ordered to substitute the new designations for the present ones.II

B.

BACKGROUND

The Act required states to submit lists of attainment status
designations for regions which achieved or failed to meet air
quality standards by December 5, 1977.17 The designations submitted are the first step in the development of a state implementation plan (a Plan).·' The Act required the Agency to pro.mulgate the states' proposed attainment status designations by
February 3, 1978, with any modifications the Agency deemed
necessary following their review.·· States were then to use these
designations to prepare a Plan by January 1, 1979, which, upon
approval by the Agency, would become enforceable federal regulations. These regulations would require all new and existing industry to .comply with the pollution reduction standards.to
Section 553(b) of the Procedure Act provides an exception
to the notice requirement "when an agency for good cause finds
12. 633 F.2d at 806.
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,388·91 (1979).
14. 633 F.2d at 806.
15. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Republic Steel Corp. v.
Coatle, 621 F.2d 797. (6th Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d
207 (5th Cir. 1979).
16. 633 F.2d at 814·15.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. II 1978).
18. 1d. § 7502(a)(I). This section requires the states to designate 88 "nonattainment
areas" any regions within their borders not achieving air quality standards within the
specified time, and to submit to the Agency a listing of any nonattaining regions. It is
through these state submissions that each state eventually must bring itself into compli·
anCe with the Act.
19. Pub. L. No. 95·95, 91 Stat. 685 (1971).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
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(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public
interest. "21
Circuit courts have considered the effect of the Agency's
failure to follow section 553(b) rule making procedures on the
promulgation of the Act's air quality attainment designations.
For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. EPA (U.S. Steel
l),n plaintiffs challenged a list of attainment area designations
which the agency ruled did not meet national air quality standards. The Seventh Circuit held that the Agency had good cause
to forego the section 553 rulemaking requirements based on impracticality and urgency/" and, that even if the agency did not
have good cause for exemption, the Act precluded the court
from reversing' the designations." The court approved the good
cause exception because "certainly such urgency exists in this
case where any delay in the [Agency's] designation would run
the risk of delaying the formulation of state implementation
plans and the consequent health detriment of delayed
nonattainment. ''III
Similarly, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle,·' the Sixth Circuit determined that the Agency Administrator had acted consistently with the Procedure Act's good cause exception to the
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published
in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual
notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include(1) a statement of time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.
22. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S.
939 (1980).
23. rd. at 289.
24. rd. at 290. The U.S. Steelr court also noted that where a monitored area indicated excessive pollution, the AgencY's nonattainment designation could be properly established. rd. at 293.
25. rd.
26. 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980).
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prior notice and public procedure requirement. 27 In that case,
plaintiffs attacked rules promulgated by the Agency for areas in
Ohio. The court found that Congress' mandatory attainment
dates for national air quality standards allowed the Agency to
ignore the usual notice and comment procedures. 28
In New Jersey u. EPA,·' however, the District of Columbia
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The
State of New Jersey petitioned for review of an Agency-promulgation rule. The court ruled that the Agency failed to adhere to
notice-and-comment requirements of the Procedure Act," and
that the Agency's provision for post-hoc comment did not cure
its failure to follow rule making procedure. 81 The court distinguished New Jersey from the U.S. Steel 1 and Republic Steel
decisions, in part, because the two latter courts' differing opinions were based partly on the recalcitrance of certain corporations and states to adhere to Act requirements. 8•
Similarly, in Sharon Steel Corp. u. EPA," plaintiffs petitioned for review of the Agency's final ruling that four areas of
Pennsylvania failed to meet the national ambient air quality
standards. IW The court held that the Agency had dispensed with
proper rulemaking procedures without good cause,811 and that
27. Id. at 803.
28.ld.
29. 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 1045.
31. Id. at 1049.
32. Id. at 1044. The New Jersey court noted that both the U.S. Steel I and Republic Steel courts recognized industry and state delaY' in compliance with air quality standards. The Republic Steel court found that "[t]his is the sixth time this court has considered Ohio industry petitions for relief from the efforts of the [Agency] to move toward
reductions of SO. pollution of the ambient air which Ohioans breathe." 621 F.2d at 799.
The U.S. Steel I court noted that the development of the formalized plans for establishing air quality standards "were in response to the failure of the states to meet prior
attainment deadlines and represents Congressional concern over the seriously adverse
health consequences of continued nonattainment." 605 F.2d at 287. The U.S. Steel I
court also cited considerable legislative testimony to support the contention that plaintiffs were not in compliance after a five-year period of time. Id. at 287-88 n.5 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 1077, 1289».
33. 597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979).
34. Id. at 378.
35. Id. The Procedure Act provides for two good cause exceptions from rulemaking
requirements. Subsection 553(b)(B) allows an agency to dispense with publishing notice
of a proposed rule and opportunity to comment "when the agency for good cause finds
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the Agency must forebear from applying any sanctions to companies in the non attainment areas until it gave statutory notice
to the companies and held a limited legislative hearing. 8s Although the Sharon Steel court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, it
chose to leave the challenged rule in effect except as to the specific designations contested in the case."
In United States Steel Corp. v. EPA (U.S. Steel Il),88
plaintiffs petitioned for review of the Agency's designation of areas in Alabama as nonattainment areas. The court ruled that
since the Agency failed to follow the Procedure Act's notice requirement, the designations must be set aside and the case remanded to the Agency.all
C.

THE COURr's REASONING

The Procedure Act Issue

In its consideration of the Procedure Act, the Ninth Circuit
cited other circuits40 to hold that the "good cause" exceptions to
section 55341 did not apply and that the Agency failed to provide
proper notice and comment for plaintiffs to respond to the Act
designations. 42 The court rejected the Agency's argument that
[and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976). Subsection 553(d)(3) dispenses
with the 30-day period for notice and comment "for good cauae found and published (by
the agency) with the rule." rd. § 553(d)(3).
The legislative history of the Procedure Act briefly described good cause. " 'Impracticable' refers to situations where execution of the agency's functions unavoidably would
prevent adherence to normal rulemaking procedures. 'Unnecessary' refers to a minor or
merely technical amendment which is not a matter of public interest." Comment, The
Good Cause Exemptions from Administrative Rulemaking Req.uirements: Divergent
Views in the Clean Air Cases, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 624, 625 (1980). The author of the
Comment also noted that the § 553(d)(3) exception operates "when unavoidable time
limits exist, when the rule is designed to correct a demonstrably urgent situation and
when those regulated may act in anticipation of the regulation." rd.
36. 597 F.2d at 381-82.
37. rd. at 381.
38. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
39. rd. at 210. The U.S. Steel 11 court remanded "to the agency so that it could
repromulgate the Alabama nonattainment list after proper public notice and an opportunity to comment." rd.
40. See cases cited note 15 supra.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). For a discussion of the "good cause" exceptions, see note
35 supra and accompanying text.
42. 633 F.2d at 813.
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statutory deadlines were so pressing as to justify use of the
emergency procedure.· 8
The Agency argued that due to the immediate need to protect public health and the statutory deadlines established. by the
Act," it could alternatively invoke a second exception provided
by section 553(d)(3).411 The Ninth Circuit disagreed because
"[b]efore that exception becomes relevant ... the agency must
first justify abandoning the requirement of prior notice and
comment pursuant to subsection (b)(B)."·8 Thus, since the
Agency had not justified abandoning the subsection (b)(B) re43. Id. The Agency's argument that pressing statutory deadlines justified the emergency procedure is clearly illustrated in its notice published March 3, 1978 in the Federal
Register:
Congress has acknowledged [the urgency of the deadlines) by
imposing a tight schedule on the designation process and requiring [the Agency) to promulgate the list within 180 days of
the enactment of the amendments. Under these circumstances
it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest
to ignore the statutory schedule and postpone publishing
these regulations until notice and comment can be effectuated
43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978), quoted in 633 F.2d at 805.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. II 1978) givea the statutory deadlines:
(a)(l) The Administrator(A) within 30 days after December 31, 1970 [the
date of enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970), shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a
national primary ambient air quality standard and a
national secondary ambient air quality standard for
each air pollutant for which air quality criteria have
been issued prior to such date; and
(B) after a reasonable time for interested penona
to submit written comments thereon (but no later than
90 days after the initial publication of such proposed
standards) shall by regulation promulgate such proposed national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards with such modifications as he deems
appropriate.
(2) With respect to any air pollutant for which air quality
criteria are issued after December 31, 1970, the Administrator
shall publish, simultaneously with the issuance of such criteria
and information, proposed national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards for any such pollutant. The procedure provided for in paragraph (l)(B) of this subsection
shall apply to the promulgation of such standards.
45. 633 F.2d at 811. See note 35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
§ 553(d)(3).
46. 633 F.2d at 812.
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quirement of prior notice and comment, it could not avail itself
of the 553(d)(3) exception either.47
In .addition, the Ninth Circuit ac~nowledged that the "good
cause" exception should be applied sparingly,48 and dismissed
the Agency's argument for a "blanket exemption for agencies
operating under pressure of statutory deadlines" because
"[s]uch interpretation of 'good cause' would amount to judicial
legislation. The urgency of the problem to be remedied does not
justify the repeal by this court of the notice and comment requirement."48 The Western Oil & Gas court further agreed with
the court in Sharon Steel Corp. u. EPADO that the Agency's actions were unlikely to assure better, more timely planning or
scheduling for the states, and that the Agency had had adequate
time within which to make the process work. Dl
The panel's analysis of the Procedure Act, though less thorough than those of some of the courts in earlier decisions, maintained a consistently strict standard concerning exemptions
from Procedure Act rulemaking requirements. DJ The court's conservative interpretation of the exemption subsections is consistent with that of two other circuits.DB
47.Id.
48. Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 449 F.2d 456, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1971), is the only case where the Ninth Circuit applied the "good cause" exception, and then only because good cause was "evident." Id.
49. 633 F.2d at 812.
50. 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. 633 F.2d at 812.
52. See note 48 supra and accompanying text for the only Ninth Circuit decision
which applied the "good cause" exception.
53. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). Both of those circuits ruled that § 553(d) requires
that publication or service of a substantive rule "shall be made not less than 30 days
before its effective date." In declaring the proposed designations immediately effective,
the Agency failed to properly follow required procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976).
At least two commentators as well as legislative history support the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the exceptions. "The exemptions from the required procedure of § 553
are too extensive. Because of the exemptions, more rulemaking is done without notice
and comment procedure than with it. Some exemptions are needed, but the exemptions
can ~ drastically scaled down." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 630, at 593
(1978). Another author states: "The APA rule-making requirements are weakened by
exceptions which free a large part of federal rulemaking from the requirements . . . .
These exceptions are too broad." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 61 (1976). A Senate Committee Report notes: "The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is
not an 'escape clause' in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms
or the facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or emergency must
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The Western Oil & Gas panel disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit's broad reading of subsections 553(d)(3) and 553(b)(B).
In U.S. Steel 1,114 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged two alternative requirements. DII The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
would allow the subsection 553(b)(B) exceptions only if the
agency showed good cause why it should be excused from the
notice and comment requirements." In any event, the subsection 553(d) requirements remained in effect.1I7 Consequently, the
Agency made no showing of good cause, since neither exemption
was appropriate.

The Remedy Issue
Plaintiffs based their remedy argument on several Supreme
Court decisions. Ds They urged the court to invalidate the existing
designations, to order the entire process of preparing designations repeated "in accordance with state and federal procedure,
and [to order the Agency] . . . to substitute the resulting new
designations for the present ones when the process is complete."DI The Agency, however, urged that the plaintiffs suffered
no actual damage even if the Agency did violate the Procedure·
Act. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Agency's view, but substantially modified the result plaintiffs requested." Though the
be made and published." SENA,.. JUDICIARY COMMITTD RaI'ORT, S. Doc. No. 248, 200.
54. See U.S. Steel I, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh.
denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980).
55. Id. at 286. For the two requirements enunciated in U.S. Steel I, see note 35
supra.

56. 633 F.2d at S12. At least one commentator agrees with the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the exemptions. K. DAVIS, supra note 53, II 6:29 to :31, at 588-99, urges the
scaling down of the present § 553 exemptions. Davill suggests that of the seven clauses
provided in the section, all but two-II 553(b)(B) and (d)(3)-should be eliminated. He
suggests there is a substantial difference in these two subsections and that they should
be retained and clarified. No mention is made of the alternative use of the subsections as
rulemaking exemptions.
57. Subsection 553(d) requires that publication or service of a substantive rule
"shall be made not le88 than 30 days before its effective date." 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
In declaring the proposed designations immediately effective, the Agency failed to properly follow required procedure.
58. Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). These cases concur with the view noted in
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 313, that "regulations subject to the [Procedure
Act) cannot be afforded the 'force and effect of law' if not promulgated pursuant to the
statutory procedural minimum found in [the Procedure Act)."
59. 633 F.2d at 812.
60. Id. at 812-13.
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court supported the theory that "procedural safeguards that assure the public access to the decision maker should be vigorously
enforced,"el it was reluctant to thwart "in an unnecessary way
the operation of the Clean Air Act in the State of California during the time the deliberative process is reenacted. "ell The court
instead allowed the designations to remain in force but required
that the matter be remanded to the Agency Administrator to be
filed for timely review,ea and allowed a period of time for comment on the California designations, with any revisions to be
substituted for existing designations. 84
The court noted that several other circuits have chosen
more conservative methods to balance the goals of the Clean Air
Act with those of the Procedure Act.n The Ninth Circuit discussed these alternative views, considered the needs of both the
61. Id. at 813.
62.Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. I 1977) describes the requirements for administrative
proceedings and judicial review in substantial detail. Subsection 7607(d)(9) notes:
(9) In the case of review of any action of the Administrator to which this subsection applies, the court may reverse any
such action found to be(D) without observance of procedure required by law, if
(i) such failure to observe such procedure is arbitrary or capricious, (ii) the requirement of paragraph (7)(B) haa been met,
and (iii) the condition of the last sentence of paragraph (8) is
met.
The last sentence of § 7607(d)(8) of the Act, in turn, provides:
In reviewing alleged procedural errors, the court may invalidate the rule only if the errors were so serious and related to
matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a
substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such errors had not been made.
Id. § 7607(d)(8).
64. 633 F.2d at 813. In addition, the plaintiffs also requested the Ninth Circuit to
review the California procedures used in developing the attainment status designations
submitted to the Agency. However, the court's study of applicable code sections of the
Act revealed no specific procedural responsibilities and no express authority given to the
Agency Administrator to review procedures used for compliance with state law. Furthermore, Congress specifically imposed procedural responsibilities on states and did not require the Agency to review the procedures actually used for compliance with state law.
Consequently, the court ruled that state law must provide any remedy the plaintiffs seek
in this regard. Id. at 813-14.
65. The New Jersey, U.S. Steel 11 and Sharon Steel courts left all but the challenged designations in effect. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d at 1050; U.S. Steel II, 595
F.2d at 215; Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d at 381. The Sharon Steel court also
provided for a limited legislative hearing giving statutory notice and opportunity to comment. 597 F.2d at 382.
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Procedure Act and the Clean Air Act and chose to combine
these important procedural and health needs." It noted that
U[o)rdinarily a failure to comply with the [Procedure Act) requirements of prior notice and comment would invalidate such
designations. We are reluctant to so hold under the circumstances of this case. "''7 The court further stated that "[o)ur intervention into the process of environmental regulation, a process of great complexity, should be accomplished with as little
intrusiveness as feasible."68 While the court referred to little legislative history in making its determination, it appeared to consider the need to maintain strict controls over governmental
agencies by requiring them to follow the rule making process laid
out in the Procedure Act as well as to give individuals adequate
notice of rulemaking and a chance to comment on those rules."

D.

CRmQUE

The Ninth Circuit chose a very liberal remedy under the
circumstances of the case. The Fifth Circuit, in U.S. Steel 11,'70
perceptively noted: "Section 553 is designed to ensure that affected parties have an opportunity to participate in and infiuence agency decision making at an early stage, when the agency
is more likely to give real consideration to alternative ideas.'''Jl If
the challenged designations are to remain in effect, as the Ninth
Circuit held, even though notice and comment will eventually be
allowed, plaintiffs may not actually have much influence upon
Agency decision-making with regard to the designations. One
can only hope that the Agency will actually acknowledge the
comments of plaintiffs during the section 553 period. The Ninth
Circuit failed to address this issue in its decision, and, since its
remedy did not provide for assuring that proper procedure is
carried out at the initiation of rulemaking procedure, there appears to be a serious flaw in the remedy.
It seems the Ninth Circuit's major motive for maintaining

the designations was to protect the goals of the Act from being
undermined. This worthy goal is one which both the Seventh
66. 633 F.2d at 813.
67. Id. (footnotes omitted).
68.ld.
69.ld.
70. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
71. Id. at 214.
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and Sixth Circuits'lll determined was of greater value than the
rulemaking requirements.
One commentator has enthusiastically supported the decision that the Agency Administrator had "good cause" to forego
the Procedure Act requirements although "fairness to the petitioners required that they be afforded some opportunity to participate in the Administrator's" decision.'1I This analyst convincingly argues that air quality standards are of. sufficient
importance to human health and safety that the regulations establishing the standards must be put into effect as quickly as
possible. The Ninth Circuit followed this basic philosophy by allowing the plaintiffs some opportunity to participate in the Administrator's decision. '14 The substance of that opportunity may
be more apparent than real. If parties are not allowed to participate in the decision-making process prior to the decision, their
comments and objections will have little if any real effect on administrative decisions already determined.
The court took a chance by allowing the compromise result.
It diluted its previously consistent philosophy of seldom allowing the "good cause" exception by now giving the Agency
considerable manipulative control over the final designations
without requiring reconsideration of the attainment designations. Several circuit courts,'III on the other hand, have weighed
the Agency's Procedure Act violations very differently. As the
Sharon Steel court pointed out, the Agency Administrator originally had adequate time to review the proposed designations of
the states: "The [Agency] Administrator should have been able
to publish the Pennsylvania designations within ten days after
December 6, 1977 [the states' submission deadline], offering
them not as a final rule but as a proposed rule,''''' It can be argued that the Agency's failure to proceed immediately with its
review of the state submissions and to publish them at least on a
"proposed" basis was a serious mistake, and, by excusing the

u.s.

72. Republic Steel v. C08tle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980);
Steel I, 605 F.2d 283
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980).
73. See Comment, supra note 35, at 635.
74. 633 F.2d at 813.
75. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980)i Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA,
597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); U.S. Steel II, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. 597 F.2d at 380.
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Agency's administrative inadequacies, questions the integrity of
the Procedure Act.
E.

CONCLUSION

The Procedure Act is meant to protect individuals from
governmental agency abuse by providing a method whereby
timely outside input and comment can influence rulemaking. 77
In an effort to balance this administrative goal with the health
requirements of the Act, the Ninth Circuit has chosen a basically sound remedy. However, the panel failed to observe that
not requiring the Agency to fulfill its rulemaking obligations
from the outset may make late input by outside sources totally
ineffective. The decision was a difficult one. Although protecting
public health is extremely important, so is safeguarding the Procedure Act requirements. The Ninth Circuit's attempt to balance both, however, may have set an extremely lax standard for
Procedure Act rulemaking which could be troublesome if not
carefully monitored.
Cherie P. Shanteau·

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
In other cases within this Survey period, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the degree of commitment by a utility company to determine when a project "commenced construction" for purposes
of pollution limitations, narrowly construed what constitutes a
"public hearing," and rejected the receiving water quality test as
a basis for granting a variance.

A.

TIMING OF "COMMENCED CONSTRUCTION"

In two decisions, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the criteria
which determine when a project will be deemed to have "commenced construction." Depending on the date of commencement, different air pollution standards apply. In Northern
77. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at § 61.
• Second-year student, University of San Francisco School of Law.
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Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 1 the Ninth Circuit found a
contract for the purchase of two steam generators coupled with
the construction of a boiler apparatus constituted commencement of construction. In Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. EPA,· the
Ninth Circuit upheld an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) decision that mere planning or design work is not sufficient commencement within the meaning of the regulations.

In Northern Plains, a consortium headed by the Montana
Power Company (the Power Company) contracted to build four
coal fired, electrical generating plants in Colstrip, Montana. a In
1974, while two plants were under construction, the Power Company contracted for steam generators for the other two plants.·
The Power Company completed the first two plants by 1976 but
encountered delays in obtaining permits for the remaining
plants. The Power Company contested an EPA requirement for
a "prevention of significant deterioration of air quality" (PSD)
permit.' The Ninth Circuit initially upheld this requirement'
and the Power Company proceeded with its application for the
permit. The EPA at first denied the permit, but subsequently
reversed its position.'
In Sierra Pacific, two companies joined in constructing a
two unit coal-fired electric power plant in Humboldt County,
Nevada. The EPA found Sierra Pacific had commenced construction of only one of the two units prjor to a September 19,
1978 cutoff date. Consequently, the EPA held the second unit to
more stringent air pollution requirements.'

Both cases focus on the definition of "commenced" in order
1. 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were Tang
and Schroeder, J.J.).
2. 647 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Boochever, J.; the other panel members were
Duniway, J. and Taylor, D.J., sitting by designation).
3. 645 F.2d at 1351. The consortium included Pacific Power & Light Company,
Portland General Electric Company, Puget Sound & Light Company, and Washington
Water Power Company.
4.ld.
5. See Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D. Mont. 1977). In 1974,
the EPA required PSD pe~its for sources which were commenced on or after June I,
1975. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).
6. See Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1979).
7. 645 F.2d at 1352.
8. 647 F.2d at 62.
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to determine the applicable standards. EPA regulations define
"commenced" as that point in time when "an owner or operator
has undertaken a continuous program of construction or modification or. . . entered into a contractual obligation to undertake
and complete, within a reasonable time, a continuous program of
construction or modification.'" The Northern Plains court
adopted this definition of "commenced" by rejecting a more
stringent interpretation;lO the Sierra Pacific court faced no such
hurdle in adopting the same definition. l l
Applying the common definition to its facts, the Northern
Plains court found commencement prior to the cutoff date. The
Sierra Pacific court, however, came to the opposite conclusion.
Critical to both decisions was the degree of commitment made
by the companies. In Northern Plains, the purchase of steam
generators and a boiler met the test while the planning and designs of the company in Sierra Pacific did not.
In these two cases, the Ninth Circuit developed guidelines
for future decisions. When a change in regulations is anticipated,
a company which enters into binding contracts to purchase or
construct major components for its project prior to the cutoff
date will enjoy the luxury of meeting the less stringent
requirements.

B.

A'ITEMPTING TO DEFINE "PUBLIC HEARING"

In Amvac Chemical Corp. v. EPA,lJ the Ninth Circuit held
that the EPA's decision not to hold a public hearing is not reviewable by the court of appeals as an "order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing." Petitioner, Amvac
Chemical Corporation (AMV AC), manufactures dibromochloropropane (DBCP), an insecticide used to control nematodes. AMVAC is required to register DBCP under the Federal
9. 40 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1980).
10. 645 F.2d at 1353·54. The Council argued that under 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(A)
(1976), the Power Company must, in addition to the requirement of C.F.R. § 60.2, obtain
all required approvals or permits. 645 F.2d at 1354. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu·
ment because § 7479 itself limited its applicability to a specific portion of the Clean Air
Act. That portion did not apply to the Power Company. [d. at 1354·56.
11. 647 F.2d at 66·67.
12. 653 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Price, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Ferguson, J., and Goodwin, J., dissenting).
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Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).13 The EPA
administers FIFRA and carries out its statutes and regulations.
In September and October 1977, EPA issued several notices
and orders indicating an intent to ban the use of DBCP products.14 Although none of the notices or orders were preceded by
public or private hearings, EPA did invite interested parties to
submit information concerning DBCP. In September 1978, EPA
proposed an unconditional ban on the use of DBCP on twentythree specified food crops. AMVAC requested a hearing but initially objected only to the ban on one crop. AMVAC unsuccessfully sought leave to amend its request to include the other
twenty-two crops. AMVAC then petitioned for review in both
the district court and the court of appeals. EPA filed a motion
to dismiss the district court action. This motion was denied and
EPA appealed.' Both appeals were consolidated.
Section 16(b) of FIFRA provides for review by the court of
appeals of "cases of actual controversy as to the validity of any
order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing."lll
The critical issue, then, was the definition of "public hearing."

In finding no "public hearing," the Amvac court first de.cided that the EPA action was merely procedural in nature and
that Congress never intended purely procedural agency actions
to be reviewed by the circuit courts.1e To bolster its position, the
13. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976).
14. On September 8, 1977, EPA issued a Notice of Intent to Suspend and Conditionally Suspend Registration of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. On September
15, 1977, it issued a Notice of Rebuttable Presumption Againat Registration and Continued Registration of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. On September 27, 1977, EPA
issued a Suspension Order Unconditionally Suspending the Use of DBCP Products, and
one month later, A Notice of Intent to Cancel the Registration or Change the Classification of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. 653 F.2d at 1261.
15. Section 16(b) of FIFRA provides in part:
In the case of actual controversy as to the validity of any
order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing,
any person who will be adversely a1I'eeted by such order and
who had been a party to the proceedings may obtain judicial
review by filing in United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has a place of business
within 60 days after the entry of such order, a petition praying
that the order be set aside in whole or in part.
7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1976).
16. 653 F.2d at 1263.
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Ninth Circuit examined cases in which a public hearing was
found. In Louisiana v. Train,l' the Louisiana district court
found a public hearing where notice was given, and the parties
gave oral presentations, examined witnesses and presented other
evidence. The import of Louisiana is that section 16(b) was applied in a situation where no formal public hearing was held.
Another case applied section 16(b) where there was a need for
consistency in litigation. Ie However, where the issue only involves construing the statutory rules of administrative procedure, the district court maintains jurisdiction. III The Amvac
court also cited Harrison v. PPG Industries,"o in which the Supreme Court found a final administrative action reviewable only
by the courts of appeal and not the district courts. The Amvac
court distinguished Harrison, because the latter concerned a "final" action.
The· Ninth Circuit then distinguished a recent District of
Columbia case, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,1l
on the grounds that a hearing took place and that Costle turned
on statutory interpretation. In Costle, the parties submitted legal memoranda to the Administrative Law Judge. A pre-hearing
conference was scheduled but never held, and oral arguments
were requested and denied.I I The Costle court examined extensively the statutory language, case law and legislative history of
section 16(b)18 before concluding as a matter of judicial policy
that circuit courts have jurisdiction to review agency actions if
"administrative proceedings have developed an adequate record.""4 In Costle, the court found a sufficient record for circuit
court jurisdiction.
The Amvac court determined the Congressional intent limited circuit court jurisdiction to final decisions of the Administrator. Circuit courts must have adequate records with which to
work. Finding an insufficient record here, the Ninth Circuit refused jurisdiction and held that the district court must hear the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

392 F. Supp. 564 (W.O. La. 1975).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1978).
446 U.s. 578 (1980).
631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
1d. at 926.
23. 1d. at 927-31.
24. 1d. at 932.
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issue first. lUI
Judge Goodwin dissented. Ie He argued that, under Castle,
the Ninth Circuit should have found circuit court jurisdiction.
The dissent found an adequate record for appellate review in
that both parties submitted briefs and made oral presentations. I' Also, the Administrative Law Judge issued a nine-page
opinion and the EPA Administrator affirmed the judge's opinion
in a five-page order. Ie
The test enunciated by the District of Columbia Circuit and
argued and adopted by both the majority and the dissent appears to be correct. However, the majority misapplied it. The
case came to the Ninth Circuit with briefs, an opinion and an
administrative order.Ie Such a record should be adequate for appellate review especially since, as the dissent maintains, no further record could be created and "[t]he district court's review
will proceed in exactly the same manner as our review would
proceed."ao Thus, the Amvac majority left ambiguous the issue
of what constitutes a public hearing.

C.

RECEMNG WATER QUALITY TEST REJECTED

In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Castle. al the Ninth Circuit
rejected "receiving water quality" as a basis to grant variances.
Petitioners operate bleached kraft pulp mills on the west side of
Humbolt Bay and discharge effluent into the Pacific Ocean. In
1976, the EPA issued effluent limitations for various types of
bleached kraft pulp, paper and paperboard mills. 8J A variance
for these limitations will be allowed if the pollutor can show that
it is affected by factors "fundamentally different" from those
used in the guidelines. aa
In 1977, the California State Water Resources Control
25. 653 F.2d at 1265.
26. ld. (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
27. ld. at 1266 n.3. Both parties spoke to the judge at a pre.hearing conference.
28.ld.
29. ld. at 1266.
3O.ld.
31. 642 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Duniway, J.; the other panel members were
Choy and Sneed, J.J.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1981).
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 430 (1980).
33. ld. § 430.62.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/7

30

Haggerty and Shanteau: Environmental Law

1982]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

185

Board (the Board) granted variances to petitioners, subject to
EP A approval. The Board based its decision on an expectation
that no water quality problems would arise from the variance.
The EPA Administrator denied the variance requests on the basis that the Board failed to find the non-water quality environmental effects of adherence to the limitations "fundamentally
different" from those projected by the EPA for the industry as a
whole.
The Crown Simpson panel framed the issue thus:
"[W]hether, in insisting that a particular discharger show a
'fundamental difference' in his plant before granting a variance,
the agency must consider receiving water quality as a factor
• . . . "s. The panel discovered that, although the costs of compliance to the petitioner would be high, the Board never found
the environmental effects to be "fundamentally different" for
these companies' plants as opposed to others in the industry.sa
Instead, the Board's opinion relied upon the quality of the receiving water to grant the variance. The Ninth Circuit found
such "heavy reliance" on the quality of receiving water
misplaced. 18
The Crown Simpson court focused on the recent District of
Columbia decision, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle.17 In Weyerhaeuser, the court examined the underlying policies and history
of the water pollution control laws and found past efforts to control water pollution had failed when the focus was on the quality
of receiving water.1I
The Crown Simpson court also examined a previous Ninth
Circuit casel9 in accord with Weyerhaeuser before holding that
the recent Water Act shifted its focus from receiving water quality to technological control of efBuent.40 The court, therefore, affirmed the EPA's decision to deny the variances.
34. 642 F.2d at 326.
35. ld. In fact, one of petitioner's own witnesses testified that petitioner's plant did
not differ much from other plants as far as non·water quality environmental impacts was
concerned. ld.
36.Id.
37. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
38. ld. at 1042.
'
39. Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980).
40. 642 F.2d at 327.
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In Crown Simpson, the Ninth Circuit recognized the changing trend of the legislature and judiciary to prevent further deterioration of our valuable water resources rather than to maintain
pollution at a minimal level. As past experiences have illustrated, focussing on receiving water quality defeats the purpose
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
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